Suchergebnisse

This article examines the appointments and survival of expert ministers (i.e., ministers with educational and professional expertise in the portfolio to which they are appointed) in new democracies. Using a novel data set on 11 Central and Eastern European countries from 1990 until 2012, I test competing hypotheses derived from delegation theory, communist legacies approach, technocratic populism studies, and semi-presidentialism literature. The first study shows that experts without political experience (technocrats) have specific cabinet appointment patterns distinguishing them from party politicians and politically experienced experts. For example, technocrats have high chances of being appointed during an economic downturn. The conditional risk set survival analysis has revealed that compared to their politically experienced colleagues, technocrats have higher chances of remaining in their positions if there was a change in the PM's candidacy. Moreover, they have long careers independently of the continuity of the PM's party in government and the PM's partisan status. Strikingly, patterns of portfolio specialization from the communist period remained in place after the regime change (e.g., expert ministers holding the portfolios of finance and economy). However, holding these specific portfolios does not decrease the minister's risk of being dismissed. These findings have ramifications for issues surrounding cabinet formation, institutional choice, and populism in new democracies.

This article examines the appointments and survival of expert ministers (i.e., ministers with educational and professional expertise in the portfolio to which they are appointed) in new democracies. Using a novel data set on 11 Central and Eastern European countries from 1990 until 2012, I test competing hypotheses derived from delegation theory, communist legacies approach, technocratic populism studies, and semi-presidentialism literature. The first study shows that experts without political experience (technocrats) have specific cabinet appointment patterns distinguishing them from party politicians and politically experienced experts. For example, technocrats have high chances of being appointed during an economic downturn. The conditional risk set survival analysis has revealed that compared to their politically experienced colleagues, technocrats have higher chances of remaining in their positions if there was a change in the PM's candidacy. Moreover, they have long careers independently of the continuity of the PM's party in government and the PM's partisan status. Strikingly, patterns of portfolio specialization from the communist period remained in place after the regime change (e.g., expert ministers holding the portfolios of finance and economy). However, holding these specific portfolios does not decrease the minister's risk of being dismissed. These findings have ramifications for issues surrounding cabinet formation, institutional choice, and populism in new democracies.

This article examines the appointments and survival of expert ministers (i.e., ministers with educational and professional expertise in the portfolio to which they are appointed) in new democracies. Using a novel data set on 11 Central and Eastern European countries from 1990 until 2012, I test competing hypotheses derived from delegation theory, communist legacies approach, technocratic populism studies, and semi-presidentialism literature. The first study shows that experts without political experience (technocrats) have specific cabinet appointment patterns distinguishing them from party politicians and politically experienced experts. For example, technocrats have high chances of being appointed during an economic downturn. The conditional risk set survival analysis has revealed that compared to their politically experienced colleagues, technocrats have higher chances of remaining in their positions if there was a change in the PM's candidacy. Moreover, they have long careers independently of the continuity of the PM's party in government and the PM's partisan status. Strikingly, patterns of portfolio specialization from the communist period remained in place after the regime change (e.g., expert ministers holding the portfolios of finance and economy). However, holding these specific portfolios does not decrease the minister's risk of being dismissed. These findings have ramifications for issues surrounding cabinet formation, institutional choice, and populism in new democracies.

This article analyzes the recruitment of CEOs at the 100 largest German companies, focusing on how the transition from "Deutschland AG" to integration with European and global markets has impacted the recruitment and career patterns as well as networks of German CEOs. This study found signs of both continuity and change. The percentage of technically educated German CEOs, as well as CEOs with a Ph.D., continues to be quite high. In contrast, the professionalization of managerial positions in Germany, the decline in corporate tenure, and a gradually opening recruitment market reflect the changing orientation of German corporate culture toward international markets. The analysis of the overall corporate network and its components reveals that the density of the overall corporate network in Germany has increased, which corresponds to the increased number of CEOs with shared alumni experience as well as with additional connections through various policy associations. The density of co-worker networks has, however, decreased. The structure of the German corporate network is not unified but consists of a set of highly dense groups (cliques). The findings and their implications for further research on change in German corporate structures are discussed.

"In Western Europe, legislators usually remain loyal to the parliamentary party group built by the party for which they won the election. In the case of Eastern Europe, parliamentarians switch parliamentary party groups more frequently. In this article, the assumption is tested that the high occurrence of parliamentary party switching in these countries stems from the career advantages of MPs who switched parties. Data from ten Central and East European countries (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria), which include observations from 1990 to 2009, was analyzed. Based on the results of Poisson regressions, compared the effect sizes of parliamentary party switching on tenures are compared to the effect sizes of party leadership and local experience on tenures. In most parliaments except for those of Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Croatia, the effect size of party switching was higher than the effect sizes of leading party experience and local/regional experience on parliamentary tenures. At the individual level, MPs aim to protect their careers from the volatile preferences of the voters by changing their party affiliations. At the aggregate level, however, these micro-motives led to increasing electoral uncertainty because of party volatility." (author's abstract)

The article investigates continuities in the formation and careers of political elites in post-Soviet Russia. Data on the recruitment and careers of MPs (from 1993 until 2003), cabinet ministers (1991 until 2011) and governors (from 1991 until 2011) were used. The authoress identified a partial reproduction of the political elite which may be defined as reproduction circulation. The first form is structural reproduction that is evident in continuities of the socio-demographic profile of political elites. The second-strongest form of path dependency is functional reproduction that was found in career paths of political elites. Finally, individual reproduction was prominent. This reproduction should decrease over time, while functional and structural reproduction are likely to remain.

This article focuses on the patterns of parliamentary representation and careers in post-communist Ukraine. The data includes individual information on 1768 members (with substitutes) of the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, from the parliamentary elections in 1990 through to 2007. Low chances for the social upward mobility of sociodemographic groups such as women and poorly educated people were identified, as well as the high impact of social status on inclusion in the political ruling strata, as exemplified by business elites. Furthermore, MPs with an entrepreneurial background have a greater chance of staying in parliament for three or more legislative terms. The chances of remaining in the Verkhovna Rada are also greater for former Supreme Council parliamentarians, while a high-ranking nomenklatura position has no significant effect on the status of an incumbent. Experience in a political party is crucial for a career in parliament. Parliamentarians with leading party experience prior to their recruitment are likely to obtain an incumbent status, while MPs who substitute their elected colleagues have lower chances of becoming long-standing incumbents.

"The article investigates continuities in the formation and careers of political elites in post-Soviet Russia. Data on the recruitment and careers of MPs (from 1993 until 2003), cabinet ministers (1991 until 2011) and governors (from 1991 until 2011) were used. The authoress identified a partial reproduction of the political elite which may be defined as reproduction circulation. The first form is structural reproduction that is evident in continuities of the socio-demographic profile of political elites. The second-strongest form of path dependency is functional reproduction that was found in career paths of political elites. Finally, individual reproduction was prominent. This reproduction should decrease over time, while functional and structural reproduction are likely to remain." (author's abstract)